Washington's Chip Rollbacks Put Rare Earths Back on the Table

empty formal interior, natural lighting through tall windows, wood paneling, institutional architecture, sense of history and permanence, marble columns, high ceilings, formal furniture, muted palette, An immense, empty legislative hearing room at dawn, sunlight slanting through tall, grimy windows, illuminating a long oak table scattered with untouched briefing folders and a single redacted export control dossier. At the center of the marble floor, beneath a cracked glass inlay, lies a disused periodic table—only the rare earth elements subtly illuminated from below in dull amber, their glow barely piercing the dust and shadows, the rest of the chart dark and forgotten. [fal-ai/z-image/turbo]
If the US reverses export controls tied to spring-era leverage, then China’s rare earth licensing and Russian oil routing may reflect parallel recalibrations of supply security rather than negotiated concessions.
Analysts commenting on the rollbacks say each restriction reversed so far was one Washington imposed this spring, either in April or May, and that they were intended to build leverage over the speed of Chinese rare earth exports. Anna Ashton, speaking on the South China Morning Post's video commentary, said the licensing approvals for rare earths have picked up and shipments are beginning to flow more smoothly, though no approvals have been granted for military end users. The rollbacks therefore alter the access that Chinese manufacturers have to heavy rare earth magnets, which are used in electric vehicles, combustion engines and a wide range of electronics. The supply behind that leverage is itself constrained. Dysprosium and neodymium, the heavy rare earths in short supply, come primarily from Myanmar, where the state involved has been unstable for six to eight months, and China is itself finding these inputs hard to obtain. Beijing's licensing decisions therefore reflect its own supply security as well as its position toward Washington, which limits how far it can trade access for concessions. On Russian oil, the analyst expects that China cannot stop buying Russian crude and gas, since Russia is one of its main suppliers and a larger share of its imports now comes from there. Purchases could instead move through smaller companies rather than the main state oil and gas firms, a pattern already visible in purchases from Iran, and the exposure to secondary sanctions depends on whether major banks process those payments.

† Analysis: the writer's conclusion from the reported facts, not a fact stated in the source.

  • The article correctly infers that China's licensing decisions serve as a dual-purpose mechanism for both geopolitical leverage against the U.S. and domestic supply security. It also reasonably infers that China's reliance on Russian energy necessitates the use of smaller, intermediary companies to mitigate the risk of secondary sanctions, a strategy supported by the expert's comparison to Iranian oil trade patterns.
Published November 14, 2026