A 2016 Ruling Sets the Terms the Manila Code Cannot Yet Settle
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The South China Sea code of conduct remains unbound: if it is not legally enforceable, then conduct on the water will continue to be shaped by presence rather than principle, as ASEAN’s approach to dispute resolution favors reference over ruling.
In 2016 an international arbitration tribunal ruled that China's sweeping claims in the South China Sea have no basis under international law, and Beijing rejects that decision. The ruling fixed the legal argument, but it did not fix the sea. The code of conduct now being negotiated is the attempt to turn that unsettled argument into rules that govern ships on the water, and it is the same contest carried into the drafting. Southeast Asian states want the code to reflect international law, which some of them accuse China of ignoring, while Beijing insists its actions have been lawful and professional.
The parallel stops at the form of the instrument. The 2016 ruling was a single judgement by one tribunal, binding on the parties that accepted its jurisdiction. The code needs consensus among eleven members of ASEAN and China, and at the Manila summit the Philippine foreign minister, Theresa Lazaro, said there was no conclusion yet. Several key issues remain open, including whether the code would be legally binding, and the two sides hold different views on how things stand. The Philippines, as chair, had pledged to reach a deal by the end of this year, and Lazaro said she still hoped it could be concluded under Singapore's chairmanship next year.
The operational stakes sit in the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, where China's claims clash with theirs. The Philippines accuses Chinese ships of dangerous manoeuvres, firing water cannons and disrupting resupply missions inside its zone. A functional code would govern those encounters, so its drafting now decides which encounters are covered and by what rules. The binding question decides whether an agreed text can be enforced when a resupply mission meets a Chinese vessel.
ASEAN's handling of Myanmar shows the bloc's usual tool when consensus is weak. It extended a ban on Myanmar's leader attending summits, saying the country had failed to comply with the 2021 Five-Point Consensus, and leaders insisted that plan remains the main reference for the crisis. Exclusion and reference documents govern that dispute, not a binding judgement, and the code now being negotiated must be read against the same limits.
† Analysis: the writer's conclusion from the reported facts, not a fact stated in the source.
- The article correctly infers that the negotiation process for the code of conduct mirrors the existing legal contest over international law, as the source states the code is an attempt to turn the unsettled argument into rules for maritime encounters.
Published November 16, 2026